10. According to Brazil, the panel found at random that Article 2.4.2 of the anti-dumping agreement had obliged the investigating authorities to use all data from the entire POI. In Brazil, Article 2.4.2, the first sentence, states that dumping margins are generally based on the average price of all export transactions. However, Article 2.4.2, the second sentence, expressly recognizes that situations may occur in which this method would not be appropriate, for example where export prices vary considerably from period to period. PoI data show that, although the depreciation did not affect the normal value of Brazilian exports, export prices in brazilian real terms were totally different in the periods before and after the devaluation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 2.4.2, the European Commission has been allowed to use only export price data for the last three months of the POI, that is, the period following the devaluation. However, in circumstances that are not provided for in i), a specific adjustment may be granted where a difference in existing trading level cannot be quantified because of the absence of corresponding levels in the internal market of exporting countries or when certain functions are clearly linked to different levels of trade than those to be used in comparison. (2) The amount of the provisional anti-dumping duty should not exceed the provisional dumping margin, but it should be less than the margin if it is lower than that of the EU industry to eliminate the harm suffered by the EU industry. For the purpose of a representative finding, an investigation period should be selected that, in the event of dumping, normally covers a period of at least six months immediately before the proceedings are opened. 2. Regulations on provisional or final anti-dumping duties and regulations or decisions to accept commitments or close investigations or procedures are published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 48. The European Communities argues that there is no rule of evidence within the WTO that prevents working groups from accepting as evidence a document presented as evidence in an anti-dumping investigation, unless accompanied by “full-time and verifiable written information” indicating that it did exist during the investigation.